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EXORCISING THE EVIL OF
FORUM-SHOPPING
Kevin M. Clermontt & Theodore Eisenbergt
ABSTRACT
Most of the business of litigation comprises pretrial disputes. A
common and important dispute is over where adjudication should
take place. Civil litigators deal with nearly as many change-of-venue
motions as trials. The battle over venue often constitutes the critical
issue in a case.
The American way is to provide plaintiffs with a wide choice of
venues for suit. But the American way has its drawbacks. To
counter these drawbacks, an integral part of our court systems, and
in particular the federal court system, is the scheme of transfer of
venue "in the interest of justice." However, the leading evaluative
articles criticize the scheme because of the supposedly high number
of transfer motions and the costs they add to the litigation system.
On this scanty basis, the authors call for abolishing transfer of
venue.
Utilizing a database of the three million federal cases termi-
nated over thirteen recent years, we take a closer look. Most impor-
tantly, we see that the plaintiffs' rate of winning drops from 58% in
cases in which there is no transfer to 29% in transferred cases. This
dramatic effect prevails over the range of substantively different
types of cases. A big part of the most probable explanation for this
drop is that plaintiffs are indeed forum-shopping, but that courts
are transferring cases to more just courts, so that the decrease in the
win rate reflects the fact that courts are stripping plaintiffs of unjust
forum advantages. Statistical analysis supports this explanation and,
at long last, demonstrates that forum does affect outcome.
Further examination of reported and unreported cases sug-
gests that the burdens of operating the transfer scheme are small.
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Thus, by revealing that transfer has the benefit of countering fo-
rum-shopping, and does so without undue burden, this study argues
that preserving the transfer-of-venue scheme is a good policy
choice.
INTRODUCTION
The name of the game is forum-shopping. In the American civil
litigation system today, few cases reach trial. After perhaps some ini-
tial skirmishing, most cases settle. Yet all cases entail forum selection,
which has a major impact on outcome.'
Consider the individual case. The plaintiffs opening moves in-
clude shopping for the most favorable forum. Then, the defendant's
parries and thrusts might include some forum-shopping in return,
possibly by a motion for change of venue. Venue is worth fighting
over because outcome often turns on forum. When the dust settles,
the case does too-but on terms that reflect the results of the skir-
mishing. Thus, the fight over venue can be the critical dispute in the
case.
Cumulate these tendencies systemically. Forum selection is very
important not only to the litigator, but also to the office lawyer draft-
I "[F]orum-shopping, among both federal and state courts, [has become] a national
legal pastime." J. Skelly Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13
WAYNE L. Rav. 317, 338 (1967). See generally Friedrich K Juenger, Forum Shoppin& Domestic
and International, 63 TUL. L Rv. 553 (1989) (stressing benefits of forum-shopping). Re-
maining at the anecdotal level for the time being, we offer the following illustration from
John MacCormack, Remote Venue: Plaintiffs'Pick, NAT'L LJ., Jan. 31, 1994, at 1, 1, 30:
Lost in a thorny sea of mesquite, huisache and prickly pear, nearer to
Mexico than to any large American city, Duval County, Texas, occupies a
peculiar warp of time and culture that is not often attractive to outsiders.
Its isolation in deep South Texas and its harsh climate once prompted a
jaded 19th century traveler to suggest, "There is nothing to do in this lonely
land but drink and fornicate."
And but for one peculiar modern development, this sour observation
might still apply: Duval County, while still remote, poor and weighed down
by its disreputable past, now enjoys a remarkable popularity among Texas
plaintiffs' lawyers.
It falls south of what in Texas legal circles is called "the mesquite cur-
tain," a wandering geographical delineation known to induce apoplexy and
dry heaves among insurance-company lawyers and defense lawyers. "You
have sympathetic judges and unsophisticatedjuries. Speaking from painful
experience, once a case gets venue down there, its valuejust explodes," says
a San Antonio defense lawyer who asked not to be named.
See also Laurie P. Cohen, Laryer Gets Investors to Sue GE, Prudential in Poor Border Town, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 30, 1994, at Al, All (similar raves for nearby Maverick County, where unem-
ployment exceeds 23%, and median household income is $12,500; where fewer than half
the adults graduated from high school, and 93.5% speak Spanish at home; and where,
according to the plaintiffs' lawyer, the judge "understands things and we understand him
and the jurors are bountiful"). Leaving Texas for Alabama, we come to "Barbour County,
an ordinary little county that has become nationally recognized as tort hell." Gregory
Jaynes, Where the Torts Blossom, TIME, Mar. 20, 1995, at 38, 38.
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ing contracts with an eye toward possible future litigation. Not sur-
prising, then, there exists an entire treatise devoted to the subject.2
Once in litigation, the parties frequently dispute venue. Litigators
deal with nearly as many change-of-venue motions as trials.3 Thus,
forum selection is a critical concern of the legal system.
The law both creates this reality and attempts to alleviate it. The
American way is to provide plaintiffs with a wide choice of venues. To
offset the obvious drawbacks of this approach, the law provides as an
integral part of our court systems, and in particular the federal court
system, the scheme of transfer of civil venue "in the interest of
justice."4
Because of transfer's intuitive appeal, most commentators ap-
prove of the device uncritically.5 Indeed, some reformers would
broaden the transfer mechanism to substitute for the current law on
judicial jurisdiction and venue.6 Yet, over the years, several articles
have claimed to see an ugly reality behind transfer's abstract attractive-
ness and called for abolition of the mechanism. 7
2 ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION AND FORUM SELECTION (1988 & Supp. 1994).
3 There were about 11,000 federal civil trials per year during the period 1979-1991,
but the trend over time is downward. For the number of change-of-venue motions, see
infra part I.A.
4 The focus of this Article is 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988): "For the convenience of
parties and wimesses, in the interest ofjustice, a district court may transfer any civil action
to any other district or division where it might have been brought." See generally 15
CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3841-3855 (2d ed. 1986 &
Supp. 1995). Other less important transfer statutes exist in the federal court system. See
infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text. Transfer provisions exist in state court systems,
but naturally have a much lesser significance than in a nationwide federal court system. See
77 Am.JUR. 2D Venue § 48 (1975).
5 See Edmund W. Kitch, Section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code: In the Interest ofJustice or
Injustice, 40 IND. .J 99, 99 (1965) ("[T]he section has received nearly unanimous praise
from the commentators and the courts in light of its unexceptionable objectives of conven-
ience and justice.").
6 E.g., HerbertJ. Korbel, The Law of Federal Venue and Choice of the Most Convenient
Forum, 15 RUTGERS L. REv. 607, 616-18 (1961); Russell J. Weintraub, An Objective Basis for
Rejecting Transient Jurisdiction, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 611, 626 (1991) (suggesting that the United
States follow Australia's lead in relying exclusively on transfer); see also David E. Seidelson,
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts HearingFederal Cases: An Examination of the Propriety of the Limita-
tions Imposed by Venue Restrictions, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 82, 84, 100 (1968) (proposing that
plaintiff could employ nationwide service to lay venue for a federal cause of action in any
district, subject to § 1404(a) transfer); cf. ArthurJ. Keefe, Twenti-Nine Distinct Damnations of
the Federal Practice-and a National Ministy ofJustice, 7 VAND. L. REv. 636, 649 (1954) (pro-
posing the substitution of § 1404(a) transfer for current venue restrictions). See generally
Kevin M. Clermont, Restating TerritorialJurisdiction and Venue for State and Federal Courts, 66
COtNELL L. RE,. 411, 450 n.186 (1981) (evaluating such proposals).
7 David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (pt. 2), 36 U. CHI.
L. REv. 268, 307-11 (1969); Kitch, supra note 5; cf. David E. Steinberg, The Motion to Transfer
and the Interest of Justice 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 443 (1990) (would severely restrict
transfer).
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In the leading article on transfer of venue under 28 U.S.C.§ 1404(a), Professor Kitch concluded "that the cure is itself a serious
disease." He saw the benefit of transfer as alleviating the hardship
cases that derive from the wide choice of forums, but stressed, albeit
in brief discussion, the cost of handling many difficult transfer mo-
tions. His empirical support consisted of the thirty-six transfer opin-
ions that were decided from 1962 to 1963 and published in Federal
Supplement.9 Kitch proposed that the legislature tighten the initial
choice of forums and then eliminate the transfer mechanism.10
In a more recent commentary, Professor Steinberg concluded
that the "facially reasonable" transfer mechanism is in practice "a
cumbersome and costly procedure with few real beneficiaries."" His
empirical basis for this assertion was information from the Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts (A.O.) indicating that, of late,
the federal district courts were ordering more than three thousand
transfers per year. 12 He proposed that the courts severely restrict the
8 Kitch, supra note 5, at 101.
9 See id. at 181 n.155, 137 n.180, 139 n.190.
10 Accord Currie, supra note 7, at 307 (it "costs altogether too much time and money"
to handle the factually and legally complex motion to transfer). There is nothing necessar-
ily wrong with Kitch's proposal to tighten the initial choice of forums, although it should
have some motivation besides the supposed failure of the transfer mechanism. However,
even after appropriate tightening of choice, transfer would still have a role. See genera/!y
Clermont, supra note 6, at 440-41, 450-51.
11 Steinberg, supra note 7, at 523.
12 See id. at 446 n.II (citing Letter from Charles D. Gentry, Assistant Chief, Statistical
Analysis and Reports Division, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, to David
E. Steinberg (Mar. 8, 1990), supplying data for 1985-1989, and citing Richard L. Marcus,
Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers Within the FederalJudicial System, 93 YALE Lj. 677, 680 &
n.16 (1984), for transfer statistics from 1975-1982); cf. PAUL M. BATOR E" AL., HART AND
WErHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1141 n.12 (2d ed. 1973) (pro-
viding similar data for 1968-1970); Letter from Charles D. Gentry, Assistant Chief, Statistics
Division, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, to Kevin M. Clermont (Sept.
20, 1994) (on file with authors) (providing similar data for other years). In the table be-
low, we combine data from these various sources, and we correct the numbers for 1985-
1989 to remove Professor Steinberg's mistaken inclusion of proceedings under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407. The data represent the number of transfers during the fiscal year ending on June
30 of that year:
NUMBER OF NUMBER OF
FISCAL YEAR TRANSFERS FISCAL YEAR TRANSFERS
1968 790 1982 2445
1969 869 1983 2867
1970 1115 1984 2870
1971 1224 1985 3058
1972 1526 1986 3099
1973 1236 1987 3448
1974 1645 1988 3847
1975 1836 1989 3477
1976 2016 1990 3831
1977 1712 1991 4037
1978 1909 1992 4134
1979 1763 1995 3991
1980 2120 1994 4094
1981 2435
The A.O. compiled this information from its filing tapes and predecessor databanks,
counting district court cases that originated each year by transfer from another district.
1510 [Vol. 80:1507
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transfer mechanism.' 3
In the classic Hart and Wechsler casebook on federal courts, how-
ever, Professor Shapiro observed that the only empirical information
then available-the seemingly high number of transfers per year-is
not at all disturbing in itself:
This figure was slightly more than 1% of the total number of
civil cases commenced in the district courts during this period.
There is no indication, however, of how many transfer motions were
denied or how many of those granted were contested in the district
courts or in proceedings for appellate review.
... Don't we have to have such empirical data before any well-
informed judgments about the utility of transfer can be made?14
Indeed, the number of transfers may indicate a considerable need for
this mechanism. It could bestow benefits in the form of undoing abu-
sive forum selection by plaintiffs, as well as possibly inducing appropri-
ate forum selection initially in order to avoid a motion to transfer.
This Article provides some empirical information on benefits and
costs of transfer, before concluding in favor of preserving the transfer-
of-venue scheme.
I
BENEFITS
A. Empirical Observation of Transfer Effect
1. Overall Effect
The most striking result that our more comprehensive data set
yielded is the dramatic drop in plaintiffs' rate of winning after transfer
of venue. In recent federal civil cases, the plaintiff wins in 58% of the
These would predominantly, but not exclusively, comprise § 1404(a) transfers. See infra
text accompanying notes 46-53. The numbers in this Article differ somewhat, lagging be-
hind these numbers, because we are working from the publicly available A.O. termination
tapes, which compile information on the cases terminated in that year rather than on the
cases filed during the particular year.
Professor Steinberg also noted that over one hundred transfer opinions are published
each year, although his methodology for avoiding overinclusion is not entirely apparent.
Steinberg, supra note 7, at 464 & n.112; see CHARLES A. WIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
§ 44, at 279 (5th ed. 1994) ("Section 1404(a) has given rise to a veritable flood of litigation.
Probably no issue of adjective law gives rise to so many reported decisions, year after year,
as does this seemingly simple statute.").
13 Oddly, while faulting the costs of transfer, Professor Steinberg principally attacked
the courts' transfer opinions for considering many varied factors that seemed to get differ-
ent weights in different situations, although one would expect and even desire such deci-
sionmaking under a discretionary, individualized, all-things-considered standard such as
§ 1404(a)'s transfer "in the interest ofjustice." At any rate, his proposal was for courts to
decide transfer motions usually by considering only the location of the preponderance of
relevant wimesses and documents.
14 PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FFD-
ERAL SYSTEM 1746 & n.18 (3d ed. 1988).
19951 1511
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
nontransferred cases that go to judgment for one side or the other,
but wins in only 29% of such cases in which a transfer occurred.
Our comprehensive data set derives from all the available com-
puterized data gathered by the A.O., which cover the fiscal years 1979-
1991.15 When any civil case terminates in federal district court, the
court clerk transmits a form to the A.O. that provides information
about the case. The form includes data regarding the nontransfer or
transfer origin of the case; the subject matter; the jurisdictional basis;
the amount demanded; the dates of filing and termination; the proce-
dural progress of the case at termination; the method of disposition;
and, when a judgment was entered, who prevailed and any amount
awarded in damages. The form distinguishes among many subject
matter categories, including branches of tort, contract, and other ar-
eas of law. Nevertheless, the A.O. data do not contain many things
one would like to know, such as the occurrence of transfer motions
made but denied.
The Appendix shows win rates in nontransferred and transferred
cases of every category in use, aggregated across all ninety-four federal
districts for thirteen fiscal years. To be precise, the win rate is the
fraction of plaintiff wins among judgments for either plaintiff or de-
fendant. Judgments comprise much more than trial outcomes: For
A.O. purposes, judgments might be the result of adjudication, con-
sent, or default, but they normally do not include voluntary dismissals
or dismissals for lack of prosecution. For our purposes, we further
narrowed judgments to include only those cases in which the database
indicates a win by plaintiff or defendant, excluding outcomes
favorable to both or to an unknown party.
In sum, the database comprises 2,804,640 terminations of federal
civil cases. These yielded 985,312 nontransfer judgments and 9,389
transferjudgments. The win rate drops from 57.97% when the case is
not transferred to 29.26% when transfer is granted.
2. Case Categories
A reader skeptical of the effect of transfer might hypothesize that
the difference in win rates derives solely from the coincidence of cer-
tain categories' having both many transfers and low win rates regard-
less of transfer status. Figure 1, however, shows the win rate declining
after transfer in thirty-two of the thirty-four categories that show a sta-
tistically significant difference at the level of p < 0.1.16 (Each point
15 For a fuller description of the database, see Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisen-
berg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricim 77 CoRNsEu. L. REV. 1124, 113-84
(1992).
16 The two exceptional categories are "antitrust," which is #410, and "bankruptcy
transfer rule 915(b)," which is #421.
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below the diagonal line represents a case category in which the non-
transfer win rate is higher than the transfer win rate.)
Transfer vs. Nontransfer Win Rate
by Case Category
100 Showing the 34 Case Categories That Differ Significantly
_8080
0 0
S60
030
- 20 00 .. 00 00040 - °0
0 I 0' I
0 20 40 60 80 100
Nontransfer Win Percent
Source: Administrative Office Data, 1979-1991
Figure 1
So, the decline in win rate is not simply a result of those catego-
ries with many transfers also having low win rates; moreover, when
transfer affects win rate, its effect is overwhelmingly negative. Thus,
although the overall drop from 58% to 29% gives an exaggerated
sense of the magnitude of the transfer effect, the effect nevertheless
appears to be real.
The antitrust category involves groups of strong cases being transferred to join pend-
ing related cases, as well as the usual transfer to cure forum-shopping. By going into the
database to look at case names and characteristics, we were able to discern related cases.
We then eliminated related groups of three or more nontransfer or transfer judgments.
Consequently, the antitrust nontransfer and transfer win rates dropped from 35.21% and
44.62%, respectively, to 30.36% and 31.86%. The latter two rates differ insignificantly.
The specialized bankruptcy category should be disregarded. The A.O. has discontin-
ued that code. The category represented transfers from the bankruptcy court to the dis-
trict court because of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. District court clerks were
probably miscoding these cases as originating by § 1404(a) transfer. Further proof that
most of these cases involved miscoding, rather than § 1404(a), lies in the percentage of
cases transferred: for category #421 the transfer rate was 16.92%, which is well more than
triple the rate in the next highest ordinary category.
The only other category with a transfer rate over 5% is "insanity," which is #920. Its
transfer rate is 24.51%; however, the category's nontransfer and transfer win rates do not
differ significantly. Insanity is one of a group of categories called local questions, which
includes ##910, 920, 930, 940, 990, and 992. These categories involve actions in territorial
courts and are based on local law. Being highly distinctive, they not surprisingly yield some
unusual statistical results. As for the small category of insanity cases in particular, the cases,
both nontransfer and transfer, almost exclusively terminated during 1978-1984 in the Dis-
trict of the Virgin Islands.
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B. Probable Explanation of Transfer Effect
The situation is as follows: Plaintiffs select a favorable forum.
Courts transfer "in the interest of justice" to a presumably superior
forum. The applicable law does not change. 17 Yet the win rate mark-
edly drops. So, the supposedly procedural device of transfer appears
to have a remarkably substantive effect.' 8
1. Forum-Shopping
The most powerful explanation for the transfer effect involves fo-
rum-shopping: the plaintiffs' win rate declines because the plaintiff
has lost a forum advantage. The theory is that transfer not only causes
some plaintiffs to abandon their cases or to settle on less favorable
terms, perhaps with the formal entry of judgment for defendant, but
17 See 15 WRIGHT Er AL., supra note 4, § 3846. The transferee court applies the state
law that the transferor court would have applied, although surely this choice-of-law process
does not always work perfectly to ensure the same outcome. Also, dispute exists over
whether this principle of deference applies when the two courts have different views con-
cerning federal substantive law. At any rate, the transferee court applies its own proce-
dural law, the local variations of which could affect outcome. Therefore, change of law
could in some part contribute to the plaintiffs' difficulty in litigating successfully in the
transferee forum. See Harold G. Maier & Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying TheoryforJudicial
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 39 AM.J. COMP. L. 249, 252-55 (1991); cf. infra text accompa-
nying notes 46-53 (data include transfers under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), by which applicable
law may change).
18 A similarly dramatic effect on win rate prevails under the related doctrine of forum
non conveniens. That doctrine results in dismissal and, in the federal court system, applies
primarily where the preferred court is foreign. See 15 WRIGrr Er AL., supra note 4, § 3828.
In a survey of plaintiffs' lawyers in the 180 reported transnational cases that the federal
courts dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds from 1947 to 1984, responses covered
85 cases; of those 85, not one resulted in a plaintiffs win in the foreign court; most cases
were abandoned or settled for little. David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in
America and England: "A Rather Fantastic Fiction," 103 LAw Q. REv. 398, 418-20 (1987); see
also David W. Robertson, The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens: "An Object Lesson in
Uncontrolled Discretion, "29 TEx. INT'L L.J. 353 (1994) (arguing for reliable rules to temper
judicial discretion and otherwise to narrow forum non conveniens). However, because of
the differences between transfer of venue and forum non conveniens, our favorable policy
conclusion on transfer of venue does not extend to forum non conveniens.
Another interesting and possibly confirmatory context is removal. Of the 985,312
nontransfer judgments, 38,306 arrived in federal court by removal from state court. The
win rate for these cases is 36.77%. Perhaps the "removal effect" of a lowered win rate
results in part from a loss of forum advantage. Unlike change of venue, however, removal
has a fairly express purpose of changing outcome. SeeJACK H. FRIEDENTHAL Er AL, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 55 (2d ed. 1993).
Finally, in a limited study of the final outcomes in 19 Supreme Court cases on judicial
jurisdiction, the success rate for plaintiffs dropped from 83% in cases in which jurisdiction
was upheld to 0% in cases in which it was not. In the seven cases in which jurisdiction was
denied, five cases were not pursued elsewhere; one case was settled on terms favorable to
defendant; and in one case defendants prevailed on the merits. Christopher D. Cameron
& Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman? Forum Shopping and Outcome Determination Under
International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 769, 776-78, 817-32 (1995), questioned in Erwin
Chemerinsky, Assessing Minimum Contacts: A Reply to Professors Cameron andJohnson, 28 U.C.
DAvis L. REV. 863, 864-65 (1995). Again, this study suggests that forum affects outcome.
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also makes it more difficult for other plaintiffs to litigate successfully
in the unfavorable forum. Thejudgment database should reveal these
latter effects, with fewer plaintiffjudgments relative to defendantjudg-
ments after transfer.
More specifically, the explanation runs as follows: The plaintiff
initially chooses the forum by filing suit. If the choice is too favorable
to tolerate, the defendant moves to transfer. A relatively objective
judge then chooses the forum, ordering transfer if it is in the interest
ofjustice. The court considers many factors, with matters of conven-
ience dominating; the balance must tilt decidedly toward transfer in
order to overcome the presumption in favor of the plaintiff's choice
of forum.'9 So, while the court will not transfer merely to shift the
inconvenience from the defendant to the plaintiff, the court will trans-
fer when the balance of inconveniences is really lopsided. If transfer
occurs, the plaintiff's chance of winning declines through a variety of
changed circumstances, such as a possibly less favorable set of local
biases in the new forum. The dominant influence, however, is proba-
bly the shifted balance of inconveniences. Upon transfer, the plain-
tiff's cost of litigating will rise, while the defendant's cost will fall; the
quantity of litigation "units" that the plaintiff will purchase relative to
the defendant will fall commensurately; and so the win rate will
decline.20
One would not expect the forum to have a mammoth effect in-
dependent of the merits. However, transferred cases do tend to com-
prise those cases where the substantive effect of forum is greatest.
After all, the plaintiff tried to forum-shop, the defendant chose to
fight back, and the court decided that the forum truly mattered.
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that redressing plaintiffs' forum-
shopping advantage by transfer should decrease the win rate to some
extent.
Incidentally, as transfer works to neutralize any lopsided cost ad-
vantage, and thereby to equalize the effectiveness of the two sides'
litigation expenditures, the outcome should be more accurate in the
transferee court. Accuracy tends to be a good, being a critical aspect
ofjustice.2 ' Thus, the forum-shopping explanation of the transfer ef-
fect leads to a corollary: the effect of transfer in changing outcome is
good, putting costs to the side until Part II. Transfer removes the
plaintiff's forum advantage when the interest of justice so counsels,
and therefore removes the plaintiff's opportunity to gain an unjust
victory in litigation or to achieve an unjust settlement.
19 See 15 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, §§ 3847-3854.
20 See generally RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMI ANALYSIS OF IAW 564-66 (4th ed. 1992).
21 See generally Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analy-
sis, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994).
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Some colleagues have challenged this normative conclusion.
They observe cynically or skeptically that judges may have insidious
motives in transferring a case or may be in error in deciding to trans-
fer-all to the detriment of the downtrodden plaintiff and to the ad-
vantage of the deep-pocket defendant. However, this stereotypical
thinking ignores the reality that, in some case categories, plaintiffs
may not be little and defendants may not be big or that the casting of
the aggrieved in the role of plaintiff or defendant may be rather arbi-
trary. For example, parties in trademark cases do not fit the stereo-
types, but the Appendix shows a more pronounced transfer effect in
trademark cases than in general personal injury cases. Moreover, a
subset of the database-diversity cases for fiscal years 1987-1991-dis-
tinguishes individual and corporate American parties. For individual
versus corporation, the win rate increases slightly from 51% to 52%
after transfer; for corporation versus individual, however, the win rate
drops from 87% to 51% after transfer. Forum-shopping might be in
use by the strong against the weak. In evaluating the desirability of
transfer, therefore, one should put aside preconceptions about whom
it helps and whom it hurts.
In any case, transfer does not shift the choice of forum from
plaintiff to defendant, but instead from plaintiff to judge. Moreover,
the judge decides to transfer only in rather extreme cases of forum-
shopping, normally deferring to the presumption in favor of the se-
lected forum. In short, the transferee forum should generally be a
better forum affording a better outcome.
More fundamentally, to distrust judges with that much determi-
nation, or equivalently to assume that across thousands of cases self-
interested plaintiffs are as likely to choose ajust forum as are judges,
throws in question our whole judicial system. One could as readily
argue that the plaintiff should be free to choose the outcome of the
case, because there would similarly be no reason to trust the judge
more than the plaintiff. That is silly. Indeed, if forum actually affects
outcome as markedly as it seems to, then giving the plaintiff a choice
of forum unchecked by the transfer power has nearly the same effect
as giving the plaintiff a choice of outcome.
2. Case Selection
The best alternative explanation of the transfer effect involves
case selection: the set of transferred cases comprises weaker cases.
For example, a plaintiffs lawyer who loses a transfer motion may be
more apt to lose the judgment too, or to arrange for a new lawyer who
is apt to lose. Nonetheless, such an explanation would not likely ac-
count for the observed magnitude of the transfer effect. Moreover,
1516 [Vol. 80:1507
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this explanation is of questionable validity; after all, lawyers who ag-
gressively forum-shop might be more effective lawyers as a group.
A more powerful version of this sort of alternative explanation
would be that easy plaintiff victories often, but not always, occur
quickly, without transfer, so that transferred cases are tougher to win.
Additionally, transferred cases tend to be big and serious disputes be-
tween litigious parties.22 Undoubtedly, this process of biasing the set
of transferred cases contributes to the transfer effect. Nevertheless, it
probably does not fully explain the effect. After all, easy defendant
wins also occur to an extent without transfer, offsetting selection's ef-
fect. Moreover, it appears that defendants are winning more cases
after transfer, in an absolute sense and not merely relative to the
number of plaintiff wins.23
3. Summary
The issue, then, involves a choice between two competing kinds
of explanation: Do the data mean something after all, in which event
the drop in win rate rather obviously suggests a loss of favorable fo-
rum? Or do these output data reveal nothing, because the input of
cases decided in nontransfer and transfer forums could be completely
dissimilar? Stated differently, the forum-shopping explanation holds
the data to be more or less straightforwardly meaningful, while the
case selection view implies that output data with uncontrolled input is
too uncertain a premise to support any conclusion. Case selection is
occurring. But its existence, while advising caution before embracing
the obvious, does not necessarily destroy all meaning in the data and
preclude any conclusion. Instead, we can try to tease out from the
data whether something is going on in addition to case selection.
22 The data confirm that transferred cases generally have a higher mean amount de-
manded and take longer to litigate.
23 Although the ratio of total judgments entered (either for plaintiff or for defen-
dant) to total cases terminated drops from 35.59% for nontransfer cases to 25.92% for
transfer cases, and although the corresponding ratio of plaintiffjudgments to total cases
drops from 20.63% to 7.58%, the ratio of defendant judgments to total cases rises from
14.96% to 18.34%. This effect prevails across the range of case categories. So, it seems
that not only are plaintiffs winning fewer cases after transfer, but defendants are winning
more. That is, the transfer effect needs some explanation other than that most of the easy
plaintiff victories occur without transfer, or that transfer cases comprise a set of evenly
disputed cases. An even more powerful case-selection explanation would be that transfer
cases involve defendants particularly averse to litigation in the plaintiffs' chosen forum,
and that aversion results in their defending only cases to which they have a strong defense.
We explore such a phenomenon with respect to foreigners in Kevin M. Clermont & Theo-
dore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in Ameri, n Courts, 109 HAIv. L. REv. 1120 (1996). We believe,
however, that aversion cannot fully explain the transfer effect, which appears to be bigger
than the foreigner effect despite the facts that domestic defendants would be less averse
than foreigners and would discount their aversion by the possiblility of transfer.
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Therefore, to establish whether the forum-shopping explanation
plays a substantial role, in conjunction with one or more versions of
the alternative explanation, in producing the transfer effect, we need
to go back into the data for additional empirical analyses. These anal-
yses are informative in themselves, and they provide circumstantial
proof of the forum-shopping explanation for the decline in win rate.
C. Empirical Support of Forum-Shopping Explanation
The data include four variables that, in addition to case category,
might explain the lower win rate after transfer. Examining each varia-
ble reveals the role of forum-shopping in producing the transfer
effect.
1. Controlling for the Merits
Because weaker suits tend to correlate with larger damage de-
mands, the amount demanded can be used as a proxy for the merits
of the case.24 Therefore, by using logistic regression techniques
within each subject matter category to hold the amount demanded
constant, we can begin to see if transfer has an effect on win rate in-
dependent of the merits.2 5
Looking at the twenty-five categories with the most transfer judg-
ments to compare, amount demanded correlates significantly with win
rate in seventeen categories; 26 of those seventeen categories, fifteen
show a negative correlation,27 and two show a positive correlation.28
24 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 1165 n.99 (similar point regarding trial
data).
25 See generally id. at 1144-48 (discussing regression techniques). One might argue
that cases potentially subject to a transfer motion are more expensive to litigate, involving
additional issues and tending to be more complex overall; that they are riskier, being sub-
ject to the loss of the forum advantage; and that, consequently, a transferred case with a
given amount demanded would tend to be a stronger case on the merits than a nontrans-
ferred case for the same amount. If that is so, then the negative effect of transfer observed
by regression understates the actual transfer effect. This strengthens our conclusion that
the forum-shopping explanation is valid.
26 We required a category to have at least 20 transfer judgments that also contained
data on amount demanded. This yielded 26 categories. Of those, the category with the
fewest cases was "habeas corpus," which is #530. We discarded that category because
amount demanded seems irrelevant to an action created to permit state prisoners to chal-
lenge the legality of confinement. See WRIGHT, supra note 12, § 53.
For the purpose of these regressions, we set significance at p < 0.1. Elsewhere in this
Article, except where otherwise indicated, we use "significant" in its conventional sense of
p < 0.05.
27 This negative correlation is in itself an interesting result. A negative correlation
between expected award upon winning and probability of winning is often hypothesized.
E.g., Donald Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for Trial BiasedP, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 185, 188
(1985). This regression, then, constitutes some empirical support for that hypothesis.
28 The two exceptional categories are "asbestos," #368, and 'tax suits," #870. At least
in asbestos, a greater amount demanded plausibly implies a greater chance of winning.
Tax suits are more complicated. See 13B WRIGHT Er AL., supra note 4, § 3580. Most tax
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Focusing on those seventeen categories in which the amount de-
manded reflects the merits, we see that transfer has an independently
significant effect in eleven categories; of those eleven categories, eight
show a negative effect,29 and three show a positive effect.30
A less informative but more dramatic way to control for amount
demanded is to aggregate all the categories.3 1 Amount demanded
then has a very significant negative correlation with win rate. Transfer
independently has a highly significant negative effect, reducing the
plaintiff's chance of winning by half.3 2
This exercise suggests that for two plaintiffs with an equal chance
of winning, transfer of one usually lowers its chance of winning. This
conclusion supports the forum-shopping explanation of the transfer
effect on win rate.
2. Procedural Progress at Termination
The database also includes information on how far the case had
proceeded at the time ofjudgment. These codes can be grouped into
suits are brought by taxpayers for refunds; a bigger claim might indicate a richer and more
formidable claimant and, hence, a higher win rate. For the other tax suits, where the
government as plaintiff seeks to compel compliance, the win rate is 92% overall; as the
amount demanded goes up, the government likely makes ever more sure of its easy victory
(the comparable category #152 exhibits a nearly significant positive correlation, while the
other comparable category, #153, shows virtually no correlation between amount de-
manded and win rate). These influences could explain the positive correlation for both
sorts of tax suits.
29 The eight categories are ##110, 120, 140, 190, 360, 370, 440, and 890. The negative
effect of transfer is of large magnitude. For these eight categories, 0.486 is the mean "odds
multiplier," which is a way of expressing the size of a variable's influence. This value of
0.486 means that a 50% chance of winning drops to 33% after transfer, if all other variables
are held constant.
30 The three exceptional categories are "marine personal injury," #340; asbestos,
#368; and antitrust, #410. At least for asbestos and antitrust, transfer plausibly implies a
greater chance of winning. See supra note 16. Marine personal injury actions are more
complicated. See 14 WRoHT ET AL., supra note 4, § 3674. Most such suits are nonremov-
able by statutory provision. The most egregious forum-shopping will therefore occur at the
state court level, muting the usual transfer effect in the federal data. The comparable
category #330 also exhibits a positive effect on transfer, but an insignificant one.
31 There are 402,952 judgments that contained data on amount demanded. For
those cases, the nontransfer win rate is 73.08%, and the transfer win rate is 39.82%.
32 The odds multiplier is 0.342, which means that transfer drops a 50% chance of
winning to 25%. More specifically, with judgment for plaintiff as the dependent variable,
the logistic regression yielded these results:
Variable Coefficient Significance
transfer -1.072 0.000
log of demand -0.348 0.000
constant 2.195 0.000
chi-squared(2) = 62164.08; prob. > chi-squared = 0.0000;
pseudo r-squared = 0.1319
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"early," which means termination before any significant court action;
"trial," when judgment is entered during or after trial; and "middle,"
which comprises all other possibilities.
TABLE I
WIN RATE BY PROCEDURAL PROGRESS
Nontransfer Transfer
Early 73% 26%
Middle 41% 23%
Trial 45% 47%
As Table 1 shows, when judgment is entered during the early
stage, the win rate dives upon transfer. Figure 2 shows that the early
stage contributes proportionately fewer judgments after transfer; 50%
of nontransferjudgments occur at this stage, but only 32% of transfer
judgments do. This picture is consistent with the notion that easy
plaintiff wins occur quickly, without transfer. Yet it also suggests that
defendants are successfully weeding out cases quickly after transfer.33
Percent of Judgments by Procedural Progress
Nontransfer Transfer
Source: Administrative Office Data, 1979-1991
Figure 2
38 Even if the entire decrease in the number ofjudgments (as indicated by Figure 2
and supra note 23) consisted of plaintiffs' victories, the early win rate would drop only to
42%. Much of the observed drop, then, comes from the plaintiffs' losing more, and not
merely from the plaintiffs' lacking all those cases that are easy to win.
Moreover, as a practical matter it is unlikely that the entire decrease in judgments
would consist of plaintiffs' victories. The A.O.'s coding scheme is ambiguous enough that
some clerks in the transferee court would code the transfer decision in the transferor court
as itself being significant court action meriting a middle code, while other clerks would
not. Thus, some of the shift from early to middle codes after transfer might be an artifact
of the coding scheme.
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In the middle stage, as Table 1 shows, the win rate continues to
drop substantially. This result confirms the need for. a forum-shop-
ping explanation of part of the transfer effect.
At trial, the win rates in nontransfer and transfer cases do not
differ significantly. This result likely derives from the pretrial settle-
ment process's distilling the selection of tried cases, for both non-
transfer and transfer cases, to a residue of evenly disputed cases.34
3. Method of Disposition
The database also indicates the method of disposition that led to
judgment or other termination. Whereas the "procedural progress at
termination" variable, discussed in the preceding section, represents
the litigation stage, or time, at which termination occurred, the
"method of disposition" variable refers instead to the procedural
method, or device, used to dispose of the case.
Percent of Judgments by Disposition Method
Torianfral Dfault
Sour Default 22aef a 932%
Motion
Consent
Motion
Nontransfer Transfer
Source: Administratie Office Date, 1979-1991
Figure 3
Over 90% ofjudgmentss5 bear one of four disposition codes: de-
fault judgment, consent judgment, judgment on pretrial motion
(such as a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 or 56), or
judgment upon trial. The other judgments bear one of a number of
34 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 1128-30 (citing, inter alia, George L.
Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection ofDisputesfor Litigation, 13J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984)).
Interestingly, by comparing fully tried nontransfer and transfer cases, we see that the win
rate in judge trials drops insignificantly from 44% to 42%, but that the win rate in jury
trials rises significantly from 48% to 52%. This suggests that plaintiffs' fears of the trans-
feree jury are exaggerated.
35 The precise figures are 92% for nontransfer judgments and 89% for transfer
judgments.
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unusual codes. Figure 3 excludes these unusual judgments from the
sample population, and divides the rest according to the four most
common methods of disposition.
Figure 3 shows a gigantic shift toward adjudicatory disposition for
transfer cases. Default and consent lead to 45% of nontransferjudg-
ments, but to only 13% of transferjudgments. Motion and trial dispo-
sitions fill the gap. This picture is consistent with the notion that
transfer cases are litigated more seriously.
Although the win rate for consent judgments declines slightly
from 88.17% to 85.55%, the only method of disposition with a sub-
stantially changing win rate is pretrial motion, which has a nontrans-
fer win rate of 26.32% and a transfer win rate of 12.82%. This drop
further confirms the need for a forum-shopping explanation of part
of the transfer effect. The drop comes from plaintiffs' doing less well
relative to defendants before adjudicators in undesired forums, not
from the parties' settling in light of changed expectations. Further-
more, this decline in win rate also suggests that the transfer effect is
not the product of the parties' misperceptions. For two reasons, it is
unlikely that misperceptions about the impact of forum on the likeli-
hood of success are biasing the residual subset of adjudicated transfer
cases toward suits with a low chance of winning. First, parties who
have fought over venue would more likely exaggerate than underesti-
mate the effects of forum, and exaggeration would tend to elevate the
transfer win rate. Second, parties seem to straighten out most of their
perceptions of the forum by the trial stage, when the transfer effect
disappears.
As an additional line of analysis, disposition codes allow for the
consideration of terminations other than judgments. The most nu-
merous codes here are for dismissals for lack of prosecution and,
more importantly, other dismissals, which are primarily voluntary dis-
missals. These dispositions are not supposed to be entered as judg-
ments; in fact, only 2% are entered as judgments. Table 2 presents
the data on the nonjudgment dismissals.
Table 2 shows dismissals to be a major route out of court. It also
shows that dismissals occur more frequently after transfer. Plaintiffs
are abandoning their cases following transfer. This supports the fo-
rum-shopping explanation of the transfer effect. Indeed, because
abandonment is not reflected in the judgment data, the observed
transfer effect of win rate dropping from 58% to 29% tends to under-
state the actual -transfer effect. Adding in the dismissals for lack of
prosecution as defendant wins, but still excluding the more ambigu-
ous other dismissals, alters the transfer effect to a proportionally big-
ger drop from 53% to 25%.
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TABnE 2
NONJUDGMENT DisMissALS
% of % of
Nontransfer Nontransfer Transfer Transfer
Dismissals Terminations Dismissals Terminations
Lack of Prosecution 93,574 3.38 1,707 4.71
Other Dismissals 1,384,273 50.01 21,378 59.02
Consideration of dismissals more generally implies a greater im-
portance of the finding of a transfer effect among judgments. Judg-
ments include only a small part of all settlements, among which the
distinction between judgment for plaintiff and judgment for defen-
dant might only weakly reveal the role of forum advantage in settle-
ment. Presumably, however, the transfer effect observed in the rest of
judgments would carry over to influence all nonjudgment settlements
and other resolutions. Thus, the availability of the transfer mecha-
nism has importance in dispute resolution alternatives to judgment.
4. Jurisdictional Basis of Cases
The database allows disaggregation of terminations and judg-
ments according to the basis for invoking federal jurisdiction. Table 3
does this.
TABL 3
TRANSFER BYJuRISDIcIONAL BASIs
Total % Nontransfer Transfer
Terminations Transferred Win % Win %
Diversity of Citizenship 678,171 2.0 65.3 47.2
Federal Question 1,133,779 1.6 31.9 19.2
U.S. Defendant 388,643 1.0 29.3 14.8
U.S. Plaintiff 594,007 0.2 93.8 90.9
Diversity jurisdiction is most likely to produce a transfer, and the
transfer effect on win rate is pronounced. This result suggests that
forum-shopping is common in diversity cases, in which choice of
venue was wide.3 6
36 The very existence of diverse citizenship implies that the case has nonlocal ele-
ments, increasing the chance of forum-shopping. Moreover, until 1990, a diversity plaintiff
statutorily enjoyed a wider choice of venue, being allowed to lay venue in the plaintiffs
home district, as well as in the usual venues at the defendant's home and where the claim
arose. See WIGrr, supra note 12, § 42.
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Suits in which the United States is the plaintiff-primarily suits
for recovery of overpayments and for forfeitures-result in the fewest
transfers, and the transfer effect is least pronounced. This result con-
firms the intuition that such cases are lightly litigated but sure win-
ners, often against some beneficiary of a government program who
has been overpaid or is in default on repayment.
5. Controlling for the Additional Variables
Although a transfer effect certainly exists, some of it results from
case selection. In comparing the set of nontransferred cases to the set
of transferred cases, one sees a shift from a preponderance of high-
win-rate case categories to a preponderance of lower-win-rate catego-
ies. Similarly, one sees a shift from the high-win-rate early termina-
tion stage to the lower-win-rate later termination stages, from the
high-win-rate nonadjudicatory disposition methods to the lower-win-
rate adjudicatory disposition methods, and from the high-win-rate
U.S. plaintiff cases to the lower-win-rate cases with other jurisdictional
bases. In other words, transfer cases look like tough, big, seriously
disputed cases. This case selection might explain the transfer effect.
At each step of the analysis, however, signs have persisted that forum-
shopping helps to produce the transfer effect. Yet, a concern also per-
sists that the various threads of case selection might cumulate to a
sufficient explanation of the transfer effect.
We can test the validity of that concern by expanding the earlier
regression that involved amount demanded to include four more in-
dependent variables: case category,3 7 procedural progress, disposition
method, and jurisdictional basis. Table 4 lists the results of that logis-
tic regression, with judgment for plaintiff as the dependent variable.38
When all the other variables that we can analyze are held con-
stant, transfer continues to have a substantial negative effect on win
rate.39 This exercise indicates that case selection does not fully ex-
This observation about forum-shopping in diversity cases does not counsel abolishing
diversity jurisdiction. Instead, one could argue that the existence of this type ofjurisdic-
tion, combined with transfer of venue, protects defendants against the forum-shopping
that could otherwise occur at the state court level. Cf supra note 30 (nonremovable ac-
tions). This argument supports retaining removal rights in the face of the current push to
eliminate in-state plaintiff diversity jurisdiction. See Conference Supports Repeal of In-State
Plaintiff Diversity Jurisdiction, THiRD BRANCH, June 1994, at 4.
37 To keep the regression manageable, we considered cases from only the 20 most
numerous categories. Those categories included, however, 90.20% of the cases.
In addition to the regression discussed in the text, we ran the regression separately for
each of the 20 categories. The effect of transfer was overwhelmingly negative. No category
showed a significant positive correlation.
38 There are 342,722 cases that contained the requisite data. For those cases, the
nontransfer win rate is 76.03%, and the transfer win rate is 38.60%.
39 The odds multiplier is 0.676, which means that transfer drops a 50% chance of
winning to 40%.
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plain the transfer effect. Rather, forum-shopping plays a substantial
role in explaining the decline in win rate after transfer.
TABLE 4
LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS
Variable Coefficient Significance
transfer -0.392 0.000
case category dummy variables (not
separately reported) 0.000
log of demand -0.046 0.000
early stage -0.136 0.019
middle stage 0.108 0.054
trial stage (reference category)
default judgment 2.967 0.000
consent judgment 2.100 0.000
pretrial motion -1.159 0.000
trial method (reference category)
U.S. plaintiff 1.468 0.000
U.S. defendant -0.567 0.000
federal question -0.025 0.455
diversity of citizenship (reference category)
constant 0.687 0.000
chi-squared(29) = 243807.5; prob. > chi-squared = 0.0000;
pseudo r-squared = 0.6428
II
COSTS
In considering the costs imposed or saved by using a certain pro-
cedure, it is important to identify both direct costs and error costs.40
Professor Steinberg, in his attack on the transfer mechanism, assumes
that the only savings it generates stem from the net diminution of
direct costs that is associated with litigating in a more convenient fo-
rum.41 However, as the preceding part of this Article shows, transfer
yields considerable savings through the diminution of error costs:
transfer removes unjust forum advantage and thereby produces more
accurate outcomes.
Nevertheless, the other side of the balance also deserves consider-
ation. What are the costs imposed by operating the transfer mecha-
40 See generally Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEcAL STUD. 399, 400-02 (1973) (outlining a framework for analyzing
legal procedures).
41 See Steinberg, supra note 7, at 452.
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nism? To measure the burden of transfer, one must investigate the
number of transfer motions and how expensive they are.
A. Number of Transfer Motions
The place to begin is with the number of transfer motions
granted. Table 5 lists the number of transfers per year or, more pre-
cisely, the number of cases terminated in a given year that had arrived
in the district by transfer. This figure has real meaning only as a per-
centage of cases, and so Table 5 also measures transfers in percent of
terminations.
TABLE 5
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF CASES TRANSFERRED
Fiscal Year All Categories Nonspecial Categories
1979 1745 1.2 1216 1.0
1980 1760 1.1 1360 1.0
1981 2169 1.2 1715 1.1
1982 2281 1.2 1789 1.1
1983 2508 1.2 1887 1.0
1984 2837 1.2 2176 1.0
1985 2864 1.1 2186 0.9
1986 3006 1.1 2270 1.0
1987 3246 1.4 2409 1.2
1988 3275 1.4 2452 1.2
1989 3508 1.5 2650 1.4
1990 3434 1.6 2460 1.4
1991 3589 1.7 2543 1.5
The yearly number and percent do not seem very high. However,
Figure 4 reveals that the percent has recently shown some increase.
Looking at the category-by-category data underlying the graph yields
no special explanation of the recent increase. However, examining
data over a longer period indicates that this increase is part of a gentle
long-term upward trend.42 Perhaps that trend reflects a growing need
for the transfer device.
42 Combining the filing data on transfers (supra note 12) with the total number of
civil filings (reported in 1968-1994 ANNuAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRA-
TIE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, supplemented by Telephone Interview with
Charles D. Gentry, Assistant Chief, Statistics Division, Administrative Office of the United
States Courts (Oct. 3, 1994)). we can create an analogous graph for a longer period:
1526 [Vol. 80:1507
FORUM-SHOPPING
Percent of Cases Transferred
1.5
1.0
0.5
79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91
Fiscal Year
Source: Administrative Office Data, 1979-1991
Figure 4
The category data suggest that the overall number of transfers
overstates the burden of transfer motions. Prisoner cases43-primarily
habeas corpus and civil rights suits-make a disproportionate contri-
bution to the number of transfers. The Appendix indicates that 25%
of transfers occur in prisoner cases. These cases are special, with very
1.0
0.5
Percent of Cases Transferred
I I I I I I I I!
u.U
68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94
Fiscal Year
Source: Administrative Office Data, 1968-1994
43 The group called prisoner petitions includes categories ##510, 520, 530, 535, 540,
and 550.
I I I I I I I I I ! I
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low win rates and with distinctive reasons for transfer.44 Accordingly,
Table 5 presents the transfer data without these special categories.45
Furthermore, the transfer number and percent include transfers
other than those under the relevant transfer provision, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a). Although the A.O.'s instructions to clerks and lawyers limit
the relevant transfer code to § 1404(a) transfers, there is no code for
other transfers into the district except for multidistrict litigation
under 28 U.S.C. § 1407.46 Thus, transfers under special statutes,4 7
such as the very different transfers under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) to cor-
rect improperjudicial jurisdiction or venue,48 appear in the § 1404(a)
transfer totals.49
To get a rough idea of the proportion of § 1406(a) motions to
§ 1404(a) motions, we looked at reported cases. More precisely, we
used the Westlaw key number system to locate three years' output of
transfer cases.50 Reading these 238 cases revealed that of the cases
involving one of these two motions, only 14% were § 1406(a) mo-
tions.51 One would expect the subset of reported cases to be biased
44 Indeed, the habeas corpus statute has its own transfer provision in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (d). The statute allows transfer between the district of confinement and the district
of conviction. See generaUy 15 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4. § 3843, at 328 (describing the
limitations of venue in habeas corpus actions).
45 Table 5 also eliminates the special bankruptcy category #421. See supra note 16.
Table 5 shows the number of nonspecial transfers, as well as that figure as a percent of
nonspecial terminations. If Figure 4 graphed these nonspecial transfers, the line would
shift downward but retain its general slope.
46 See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, XI GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES
AND PROCEDURES transmittal 64, at I-13 to -14, -18, -53 (Mar. 1, 1985); Letter, supra note 12,
at 1. On § 1407, see 15 WRIcHT ET AL., supra note 4, §§ 3862-3866.
47 For a description of these special statutes, see 15 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4,
§§ 3842, 3843, at 328.
48 For details on § 1406(a), see id. § 3827.
49 For example, the large number of habeas corpus transfers means that 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(d) transfers are being coded as § 1404(a) transfers. See supra note 44. We can
exclude the prisoner categories. See supra note 43. Most of the other special transfer stat-
utes are either basically similar to § 1404(a), such as 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a) (2) for corporate
tax refund actions, or rarely used, such as 28 U.S.C. § 1631 for correcting improper sub-
ject-matterjurisdiction. For these, then, miscoding is not troublesome. We can therefore
focus on the inclusion of § 1406(a) transfers in the § 1404(a) totals.
Section 1406(a) transfers definitely do appear coded as § 1404(a) transfers. For the
§ 1406(a) grants appearing in the reporters, see infra text accompanying note 50, we could
track 19 of those 23 cases down in the A.O. database after transfer. Seventeen were coded
in the transferee court as § 1404(a) transfers.
50 The years of decision were 1981, 1986, and 1991. The key numbers were
170BII(B).1 and .2, which correspond to venue laid in a proper forum and venue laid in a
wrong forum. The cases consisted of 89% district court cases and 11% appellate court
cases.
51 Reading the cases gives one a handle on some other ambiguities in the A.O.
database. Of the § 1404(a) motions, approximately 6.6% came on the plaintiff's motion;
no § 1404(a) motions came by joint motion or on the court's motion. Accordingly, we
have justifiably referred to § 1404(a) in this Article as a defendant's motion.
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toward overstating the proportion of § 1406(a) motions,52 because
such motions often present the legally interesting question of im-
proper judicial jurisdiction or venue rather than the factually depen-
dent question of transfer in the interest of justice. So, probably fewer
than 14% of transfer motions are pursuant to § 1406(a).53
Accordingly, even excluding prisoner cases, the transfer number
and percent derived from the A.O. database overstate transfers under
§ 1404(a) and hence slightly exaggerate the burden imposed by that
mechanism. The stated figures thus predominantly, though not ex-
clusively, represent transfers granted under § 1404(a).
The reported cases also generate a rough idea of the ratio of un-
successful transfer motions to these grants of transfer. Of the
§ 1404(a) motions granted or denied, 45% were granted and 55%
were denied. Admittedly, reported cases, which typically involve seri-
ous or difficult motions, tend to skew toward a 50% success rate. How-
ever, the expense of transfer motions screens the making of motions,
skewing the background success rate toward the same 50% figure.
But differential stakes could cause a departure from 50%.54 And de-
fendants often benefit from the delay caused by moving for transfer.55
All of this produces a success rate below 50%. So, the number of un-
successful transfer motions exceeds the number of successful transfer
motions, but this limited empirical foray suggests that the ratio is not
huge.
Setting the ratio of unsuccessful motions to successful motions
rather arbitrarily at two to one yields an estimate of the number of
§ 1404(a)-type motions: roughly ten thousand per year, including
prisoner cases. Thus, transfer motions occur in less than 5% of case
terminations.
B. Expense of Transfer Motions
Although as many as ten thousand transfer motions may be made
each year, our sample of reported cases indicates that only about fifty-
52 Prisoner cases offer a telling illustration of the bias in reported cases. While 25% of
actual transfers occur in prisoner cases, see supra text accompanying note 43, only 2% of
the reported transfer cases do. On the other hand, 15% of all transfers come from cate-
gory #190, "other contract actions," which nevertheless contributes 26% of the reported
transfer cases.
53 On the other hand, § 1406(a) motions would seem to be disproportionately
granted (here 23 of 30 motions), and so the percentage of § 1406(a) motions could be
greater in the A.O. database of transferred cases. This raises the possibility that the ob-
served transfer effect of lowered win rate is partly owing to the § 1406(a) cases. However,
for the 7judgments rendered in the 19 cases transferred under § 1406(a) that we could
track down, see supra note 49, the win rate was 29%, which is the same as the win rate for all
transferred cases. Thus, the mixing of§ 1406(a) cases into the database probably has mini-
mal impact in producing the transfer effect.
54 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 1131.
55 See Steinberg, supra note 7, at 463-67.
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seven trial motions under § 1404(a) are reported each year. That is,
very few § 1404(a) transfer motions are contested or difficult enough
to be interesting or important. After all, defendants present some mo-
tions half-heartedly, and plaintiffs contest motions sometimes weakly
or not at all. A hearing on transfer is not mandatory.56 Even the re-
ported transfer cases do not seem to involve the expenditure of a
great deal of resources on the parties' part. The district courts seem
to dispose of transfer motions rather easily, usually focusing on only a
couple of factors. This is not to deny, of course, that some very visible
transfer motions are fought to the death. In short, there may be a
tendency among commentators to overestimate the expense of trans-
fer motions.57
Turning from the trial to the appellate level, there is likewise rea-
son to discount intuitive estimates of expense. Appealability and re-
viewability of transfer orders are strictly limited,58 although there is
room for reform by imposing even stricter limits.59 At any rate, few
transfer cases reach the appellate level, and those that do are over-
whelmingly affirmed. For appellate cases, the world of reported cases
is a much more complete and accurate representation of the actual
universe of cases. Our survey indicates that only about five reported
appellate cases each year involve § 1404(a) transfers, and only about
four-fifths of those actually entail review of the transfer motion. Most
of these review a denial of the motion. All of these cases entailing
actual review of the transfer motion in our survey resulted in
affirmance.
CONCLUSION
Critics of transfer of venue tend to overlook its benefits and to
overstate its costs. Our empirical investigation suggests that transfer
offers the considerable advantage of countering the very real detri-
ments of forum-shopping, and that it does so without undue burden.
The new empirical evidence is not definitive, but the transfer critics
definitely can find no support in it. Good policy calls, at the least, for
preserving the transfer mechanism.
56 See 15 WRIGHT ET Al-, supra note 4, § 3844, at 338.
57 E.g., Steinberg, supra note 7, at 509; cf. Irving R. Kaufman, Observations on Transfers
Under Section 1404(a) of the New judicial Code, 10 F.R.D. 595, 595 (1951) (describing early
experience with § 1404(a)).
58 See 15 WRIoHT ET A., supra note 4, § 3855.
59 See id. § 3841, at 321-22; Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Venue and Service of Process in the
Federal Courts-Suggestions for Reform, 7 VAND. L. Rv. 608, 631-32 (1954); Currie, supra note
7, at 309-10; Irving R. Kaufman, Further Observations on Transfers Under Section 1404(a), 56
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 1-11 (1956); Kitch, supra note 5, at 110-31; Korbel, supra note 6, at 618
n.64. But see Steinberg, supra note 7, at 472-78.
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